

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 BRASIL 02386 01 OF 02 290139Z

ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 W

-----290145Z 016752 /62

O 282340Z MAR 77

FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 0774

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 BRASILIA 2386

NODIS/STADIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: TECH, MNUC, ENRG, PARM, BR

SUBJECT: NEXT STEPS ON FRG/GOB NUCLEAR AGREEMENT

REF: (A) STATE 067066, (B) STATE 067182, (C) STATE 067818,
(D) STATE 067973

1. OF THE THREE OPTIONS PROPOSED IN REFTEL (A), I CONSIDER THAT THE FIRST -- THE USE OF THIS EMBASSY AS THE INTERLOCUTOR WITH THE GOB -- IS REALLY NOT PRACTICAL. OF NECESSITY, THE EMBASSY WOULD HAVE TO REFER ANY SIGNIFICANT PROPOSALS OR IDEAS FROM THE BRAZILIAN SIDE TO WASHINGTON, WITH CONSEQUENT FRUSTRATION ALL AROUND. THE GOB WOULD REALIZE FROM THE OUTSET THAT THIS CHANNEL FOR THE TALKS WOULD BE AT ONE CONSIDERABLE REMOVE FROM THE SUBSTANTIVE AND TECHNICAL DECISION-MAKING CENTER. I APPRECIATE THE DEPARTMENT'S CONSIDERATION IN PROPOSING THIS OPTION, BUT I DO THINK THAT THE GOB WOULD LOOK UPON IT AS NOT TRULY SERIOUS.

2. THE OTHER TWO OPTIONS ARE, OF COURSE, LINKED. CONCERNING THE QUESTION OF THE GOB'S BEING INDUCED TO START ADDRESSING OUR PROPOSALS SERIOUSLY AS THEY MAY BECOME MORE UNCERTAIN ABOUT THE FRG POSITION, WE WERE DRAFTING A TELEGRAM ON THIS POINT WHEN THE REFTEL ARRIVED. IN THAT TELEGRAM, WHICH HAD BEEN PROMPTED BY SEVERAL REF-
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 BRASIL 02386 01 OF 02 290139Z

ERENCES IN RECENT TRAFFIC FROM THE DEPARTMENT TO OTHER CAPITALS, WE WERE GOING TO MAKE TWO BASIC POINTS, WHICH I NOW PRESENT: FIRST, A REITERATION OF OUR STRONG BELIEF THAT, WITHOUT THE STIMULUS OF OBVIOUS FRG BACKING AWAY, THE GOB WILL CONTINUE TO BE INTRANSIGENT; AND, SECOND, THE NEED FOR THE FRG TO GIVE THE GOB A SPECIFIC, DIRECT, OFFICIAL SIGNAL TO THAT EFFECT. WE DO NOT

BELIEVE THAT THE GOB WILL BE MOVED FROM ITS STAND-PAT POSITION, NOW RATIFIED BY THE PRESIDENT WITH THE MARCH 11 WHITE BOOK, BY VAGUE HINTS OR INTIMATIONS OUT OF BONN THAT ARE MUFFLED BY THEIR BEING MADE THROUGH THE PRESS, WHICH SEEMS TO BE THE CURRENT SITUATION. THE GOB, IN SHORT, HAS TO BE CONVINCED THAT THE FRG IS REALLY AND CONCRETELY BEING INFLUENCED BY THE US STANCE BEFORE THERE IS ANY SUBSTANTIAL PROSPECT OF BRAZILIAN ATTENTION TO OUR PROPOSALS. WE UNDERSTAND FULLY HOW DIFFICULT THIS IS FOR THE FRG TO DO AND FOR US TO GET THE FRG TO DO, BUT WITHOUT IT, THERE IS LITTLE CHANCE OF GOB ADDRESS TO OUR PROPOSALS.

3. FROM OUR PERSPECTIVE, IT WOULD BE IDEAL IF (A) BETWEEN NOW AND THE APPROACH TO THE GOB WITH THE THIRD OPTION, (THE "NON-DISCUSSION"), THE FRG WERE TO NOTIFY THE GOB THAT IT FELT ITSELF OBLIGED TO GIVE GREAT WEIGHT TO THE U.S. POSITION AND THEREFORE WAS SUSPENDING THE DELIVERY OF THE SYMBOLICALLY (AND PERHAPS TECHNOLOGICALLY) IMPORTANT BLUEPRINTS, ETC., UNTIL THE FRG GAVE FURTHER STUDY TO THE QUESTION AND UNTIL THERE WERE FRG-USG TALKS AT THE PRESIDENTIAL LEVEL; AND (B) WE WERE SURE THAT THE DECISION ON URENCO WAS GOING TO BE IN LINE WITH OUR HOPES AND DESIRES. (HERE I NOTE THAT THE DEPARTMENT WILL UNDERSTAND THAT, ALTHOUGH THE US ACTIONS ON THE URENCO MATTER HAVE BEEN MADE NECESSARY BY THE TIME-CONSTRAINT FACTORS, THEY DO AT THE SAME TIME, REINFORCE AND GIVE FURTHER SUBSTANCE TO THE GOB CONCERNS ABOUT POLITICAL MANIPULATION OF FUEL SUPPLIES, EVEN THOSE FROM MULTILATERAL SOURCES.)

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 BRASIL 02386 01 OF 02 290139Z

RM I SAY THAT THIS WOULD BE A SEQUENCE OF EVENTS THAT WOULD REPRESENT OPTIMUM CIRCUMSTANCES FOR INDUCING THE GOB TO SETTLE DOWN TO SERIOUS CONSIDERATION OF OUR IDEAS. EVEN IF THE IDEAL CANNOT BE ACHIEVED NOW, MOVEMENT IN BOTH THESE DIRECTIONS WOULD HELP TO ENHANCE THE CHANCES OF SUCH CONSIDERATION. FOR EXAMPLE, EVEN MUFFLED SIGNALS OUT OF BONN, SO LONG AS THEY WERE PARALLELED BY CLEARLY NEGATIVE INDICATORS OUT OF URENCO, WOULD BE USEFUL.

5. IN ANY EVENT, WE FIND OPTION 3 WORTHWHILE, AND WE ARE PREPARED TO OFFER IT TO THE GOB INDEPENDENTLY OF THE CERTAINTY OF MOVEMENT IN THE TWO AREAS REFERRED TO ABOVE. WE CONSIDER IT APPROPRIATE FOR SEVERAL REASONS: FIRST, IT DOES NOT INDICATE WEAKENING OF OUR POSITION BUT RATHER A CONSCIENTIOUS DESIRE TO CONTINUE, UNDER CONDITIONS THAT PROTECT THE GOB, THE DIALOGUE THAT WAS STARTED WITH THE DEPUTY SECRETARY'S VISIT AND THAT THE JOINT PRESS

STATEMENT DECLARED WAS TO GO ON. IN THIS SENSE, IT PUTS THE GOB ON THE SPOT TO SOME DEGREE. SECOND, IT JUST MIGHT HIT THE GOB PSYCHOLOGICALLY RIGHT BECAUSE ITS TOUCH OF HUGGER-MUGGER GIVES IT AN AURA OF THE "BIG TIME". THIRD, THE "NON-DISCUSSIONS" APPROACH COULD PUT TO THE TEST THE QUESTION OF THE EXISTENCE OF INTERNAL BRAZILIAN DOUBTS ABOUT THE INDEFINITE SUPPORTABILITY OF ITS PRESENT HARD POSTURE.

6. IT SHOULD BE UNDERSTOOD THAT, EVEN WITH THE FACTORS MENTIONED IN PARA 4 MOVING IN OUR FAVOR, AND EVEN THOUGH WE CONSIDER THIS APPROACH WORTHWHILE, WE WOULD RATE THE CHANCES OF SUCCESS OF THE PROPOSAL FOR A NON-DISCUSSION NO BETTER THAN EVEN. THE BASIC GOB FEAR WOULD BE THAT ACCEPTANCE OF THE NON-DISCUSSIONS WOULD BE INTERPRETED BY US AND THE FRG (AS IT CERTAINLY WOULD BE) AS A WEAKENING OF ITS RESOLVE, THUS PROVIDING A PRETEXT FOR FURTHER FRG
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 BRASIL 02386 01 OF 02 290139Z

DELAY. BEYOND THIS, SILVEIRA AND UPPER LEVELS OF THE GOB MAY FEEL THAT THE ISSUE IS FAR TOO IMPORTANT TO BE TREATED BY OFFICIALS AWAY FROM THEIR DIRECT CONTROL. TO THE DEGREE THAT THE FACTORS IN PARA 4 ARE NOT IN PLACE, THE CHANCES OF SUCCESS DROP APPRECIABLY.

SECRET

NNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 BRASIL 02386 02 OF 02 290138Z
ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 W
-----290141Z 016746 /62

O 282340Z MAR 77
FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 0775

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 BRASILIA 2386

NODIS/STADIS

7. I WOULD PLAN TO MAKE THE PITCH TO SILVEIRA NOT LATER THAN MARCH 30. THIS TIMING TAKES INTO ACCOUNT THE

DEPARTMENT'S POINT ABOUT THE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE URENCO DECISION, BUT IT ALSO IS CONNECTED WITH THE SECRETARY'S MARCH 31 VISIT TO BONN. EVEN THOUGH THE GOB WILL BE VERY HEARTENED BY THE FRG POSITION REPORTED IN REFTEL (B), THEY MAY WELL BE UNEASY ABOUT THE IMPACT ON THE FRG OF THE SECRETARY'S STOP.

8. ALTHOUGH THE PRESIDENTIAL LETTER REFERRED TO IN REFTEL (C) WOULD BE VERY GOOD TO HAVE FOR DELIVERY IN MY MEETING WITH SILVEIRA, I WOULD NOT PLAN TO HOLD UP MY NLT MARCH 30 DEADLINE IF I HAVE NOT RECEIVED IT BY THEN.

9. I WOULD NOT PLAN TO TAKE UP THE US DOMESTIC NUCLEAR DECISIONS WITH SILVEIRA (REFTEL D) WHEN I MAKE THE "NON-DISCUSSION" PITCH, WITH OR WITHOUT THE LETTER. I AM AFRAID THAT IT WILL CONFUSE HIM WITH RESPECT TO THE ESSENTIAL POINT. THE CONTENTS OF REFTEL (D) WOULD BE PASSED ON AFTERWARDS AT A SLIGHTLY LOWER LEVEL IN THE FOREIGN MINISTRY. WE WILL BE SENDING OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON REFTEL (D) IN A SEPARATE TELEGRAM SOONEST.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 BRASIL 02386 02 OF 02 290138Z

QPM RETURNING TO MY PRESENTATION OF THE NON-DISCUSSION IDEA TO SILVEIRA, I CANNOT MYSELF GO OVER HIS HEAD TO GOLBERY WITHOUT CREATING AN ENTIRELY DESTRUCTIVE REACTION. IT IS VERY DOUBTFUL, MOREOVER, THAT GOLBERY WOULD ACCEPT SUCH A VISIBLE BYPASS. WE WOULD PLAN, HOWEVER, TO TRY TO GET TO GOLBERY INFORMALLY THE SAME INFORMATION THAT I PASS TO SILVEIRA (SEE NEXT PARAGRAPH).

11. I CONSIDER IT ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY TO GIVE SILVEIRA AN INFORMAL, PLAIN, UNIDENTIFIED PIECE OF PAPER CONTAINING THE PROPOSAL. MY LONG-STANDING DISTRUST OF SILVEIRA HAS ONLY GROWN IN RECENT WEEKS. (HIS HISTORICAL AND HERETOFORE SOMEWHAT VEILED DISLIKE OF THE U.S. HAS NOW BEEN QUITE FULLY REVEALED TO THE POINT THAT IT IS COMMON TALK IN OFFICIAL CIRCLES IN THE GOB AND THE WESTERN DIPLOMATIC CORPS.) WITH A PIECE OF PAPER FROM ME, HE ALMOST CERTAINLY (95-5) WOULD NOT DARE TO WITHHOLD IT FROM GOLBERY AND THE PRESIDENT OR TO DISTORT THE APPROACH. TO GUARD AGAINST THE FIVE PERCENT CHANCE, HOWEVER, WE WOULD PLAN TO TAKE STEPS TO GET A COPY OF THE PAPER TO GOLBERY SHORTLY AFTER ITS DELIVERY TO SILVEIRA. PLEASE AUTHORIZE ME TO PROVIDE SUCH A PAPER. IN THE FINAL PARAGRAPH OF THIS TELEGRAM, I PROVIDE A DRAFT FOR THE DEPARTMENT'S APPROVAL.

12. I ALSO FEEL THE NEED TO DESCRIBE FOR SILVEIRA WITH SOME SPECIFICITY THE NATURE OF THE "NON-DISCUSSIONS". FOR THIS REASON, I HAVE INCLUDED SUCH A DESCRIPTION IN THE DRAFT BELOW.

13. THERE FOLLOWS THE PROPOSED TEXT OF THE PAPER TO BE LEFT WITH SILVEIRA:

-- VERY CAREFUL STUDY IS BEING GIVEN TO THE

NUCLEAR POLICY "WHITE BOOK" AS WELL AS THE CORRESPONDENCE
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 BRASIL 02386 02 OF 02 290138Z

BETWEEN PRESIDENTS AND FOREIGN MINISTERS.

-- TO THESE ELEMENTS ARE BEING ADDED THE RESULTS OF THE CHRISTOPHER VISIT TO BONN AND RECENT DISCUSSIONS WITH CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT AND STATE SECRETARY GENSCHER.

-- IT IS HOPED THAT THE BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT IS ALSO STUDYING THE PROPOSALS THAT WERE PRESENTED TO IT. THESE AND OTHER IDEAS CAN BE ELABORATED UPON IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

-- IT IS BELIEVED THAT IT IS BOTH POSSIBLE AND IMPORTANT TO UNDERSTAND EACH OTHER'S POSITIONS BETTER AND TO MOVE TOWARD A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION AND WITHOUT PUBLICITY.

-- IT IS SUGGESTED, THEREFORE, THAT A VERY PRIVATE, INFORMAL DISCUSSION ("NON-DISCUSSION") COULD BE HELD AT A MUTUALLY CONVENIENT LOCATION -- PERHAPS SOMEWHERE IN EUROPE OR THE CARIBBEAN.

-- THIS "NON-DISCUSSION" MIGHT TAKE PLACE BETWEEN A FEW OFFICIALS ON EACH SIDE, JUST BELOW THE LEVELS OF THE PRINCIPALS EARLIER INVOLVED.

-- THE "NON-DISCUSSION" WOULD BE SECRET AND INFORMAL. WITH RESPECT TO SUBSTANCE, NO COMMITMENTS OR DECISIONS WOULD BE EXPECTED TO BE GIVEN OR MADE BY ANY PARTICIPANT.

-- ON THE BASIS OF THIS "NON-DISCUSSION", THE RESPECTIVE POSITIONS COULD BE EVALUATED, AND FURTHER DIPLOMATIC CONTACTS HELD. SUBSEQUENTLY, THE TALKS AT THE EARLIER LEVEL COULD BE RESUMED, AS WAS JOINTLY AGREED.

CRIMMINS

SECRET

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01-Jan-1994 12:00:00 am
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: PRESIDENT, POLICIES, DISPUTE SETTLEMENT, NUCLEAR COOPERATION PROGRAMS, NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS, CAT-B
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Sent Date: 28-Mar-1977 12:00:00 am
Decaption Date: 01-Jan-1960 12:00:00 am
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 22 May 2009
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1977BRASIL02386
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: P840086-0892, N770002-0241
Format: TEL
From: BRASILIA
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1977/newtext/t19770317/aaaaaoin.tel
Line Count: 271
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Message ID: d9ec39b1-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ACTION NODS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: NODIS, STADIS
Page Count: 5
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: NODIS, STADIS
Reference: 77 STATE 67066, 77 STATE 67182, 77 STATE 67818, 77 STATE 67973
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 01-Dec-2004 12:00:00 am
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 2981335
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: NEXT STEPS ON FRG/GOB NUCLEAR AGREEMENT
TAGS: TECH, MNUC, ENRG, PARM, BR, GE, US
To: STATE
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odb://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/d9ec39b1-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
22 May 2009
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009